Alf P. Steinbachīs personal homepage: Philosophy
Rationality
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Therefore I gather that an essay on rationality must be what people clicking their way into a philosophy page expect.
Additionally itīs probably the starting point for any hobby philosopher, and so (in contrast to some other essays Iīve planned) the discussion will not be on totally unfamiliar ground.
Last updated Wednesday, February 03, 1999
Rationality
Introduction.
Is it rational to sacrifice your life in order to save your family? Some would say yes, others no, and some, perhaps, seriously or facetiously, that it would depend on the family and the life in question. Those who answer yes might do so because they value their family very highly, and would be prepared to do anything for the family. Others who answer yes would do so because their understanding of what "rational" behavior is, perhaps just a long list of acceptable rational behaviors and rules for such behavior, includes this case (however, they might not be willing to act rationally by their own standards). Yet others who answer yes might have other reasons. And ditto for the nays, the donīt knowīs and the others; there is no single correct answer because, first of all, rationality is not clearly defined, and perhaps cannot be clearly defined, and secondly, because many factors involved in judging rationality, like the "best interest" of someone, are themselves judgmental and subjective instead of clear-cut and objective. There is no such thing as objective rationality.
On the other hand, irrationality might be possible to agree on when the behavior or belief in question is outrageously incoherent, illogical, or self-detrimental. As an analogy, the concept of entropy, defined as manifest disorder, is completely useless at a detail level, but becomes clear and valid when one considers its opposite on a large enough system. Thus it might be that although rationality itself is vague to the point of being objectively meaningless, manifest irrationality might be a clear-cut concept in some contexts: knowing irrationality does not imply knowing rationality, because the transition between irrationality and rationality lies in the borderline zone of judgements and subjective best interests, and this zone seems to extend all the way into even the most rational.
In the end I think, as a consequence of the above, that rationality would be best defined as the behavior and beliefs of an ideal person, where an ideal person is one whoīs not what you wouldnīt want others to be, and perhaps additionally is much of what you do want others to be. This definition is clearly subjective, itīs clearly vague, and itīs clearly not bound to logic alone (e.g., a machine-like robot would, for most people, not be rational no matter how logical it might be) but is also bound to individual awareness and to the common good of society, i.e. societyīs common set of behavioral codes, i.e. ethics. Having all this subjectivity, vagueness and the ethics connection out in the open is, I think, more healthy than definitions like "behaving logically", which seem to be clear-cut but which are not, and which confuse logic with (for example) ethics and subjective values.
The conventional definition of rationality.
Although there is no single, commonly accepted definition of rationality, the term wouldnīt exist if there was no common ground between various peopleīs perception of its meaning. I think that common ground might be summarized as
Acting in oneīs best self-interest.
Having a self-consistent and world-consistent set of beliefs.
Thinking logically (self-test: thereīs a counter-example at the very top of this web-page).
The first statement might seem to imply that a rational person is necessarily selfish, and indeed I think one must be! But this is not the same as egoistic: my self-interest is whatever makes me happy or fulfills my needs, since anything else would be otherīs interest, not mine. And what makes me happy, might, for example, be to protect and bring about general happiness for my family, my friends, my peer group, my country or the world at large. Thus I could act rationally in consistently pursuing my own self-interest, yet my self-interest could be such that I would be acting altruistically. Self-interest is only egoistic to those who have an egoistic self-interest.
Even at this point itīs clear that rationality, as opposed to manifest irrationality, cannot be determined with high confidence. If a person acts altruistically, is it because it makes that person happy to do so (pure and direct self-interest), or because the person is coldly calculating the consequences (e.g. induced beliefs or the expectation of returned favors, indirect self-interest), or because the person is seriously confused and illogical? Thereīs no way to tell from a single act
Having a completely self-consistent and world-consistent set of beliefs is, in practice, impossible. It would entail correlating every new fact, and all consequences of that fact, with everything previously known, which would require infinite intelligence. Thatīs not how we function (happily, otherwise detective novels would not exist). Often some stray "fact", haphazardly memorized without further consideration, is only understood as inconsistent when it becomes relevant to some conscious train of thought, e.g. during a discussion. So the requirement of self-consistency and world-consistency is a matter of degree: that in important beliefs weīre on track with reality. Of course, that again brings what seemed clear-cut (as with "self-interest") into the realm of judgment and subjectivity.
Well, if self-interest and belief systems cannot be easily externally evaluated, then at least the ability to think and act logically should be easy to evaluate! But unfortunately, most of our thinking is not a sequence of logical inferences (computers are good at that, biological brains are not) but instead involve associations, pattern matching, visualization, model evolution (playing out a situation to see its possible outcomes), searching of alternatives, and things like that. Especially associations are very far removed from the rules of logic, depending on prior experience as they do. People often arrive at firm, and usually correct, conclusions without knowing why or how, and so do computer programs that mimic the way biological brains work. Hence the inability to support a conclusion by some logical chain of inference is not evidence of being illogical, just evidence of a normal working brain doing its job. If more people were aware of this -- lack of logical inference chain is not evidence of irrationality -- we would perhaps be spared from all the rationalizations one encounters every day.
On the other hand, when a person does present a logical argument, one might see that itīs illogical, or at least indicates an inability to communicate clearly. For example, "ripe bananas are yellow, so I think Iīll take a nap" (where the conclusion does not obviously follow from the premise). However, making errors is human, and being able to make perfect logical inferences does not imply that the person is completely rational.
Rationality as a behavioral code.
The conventional view of rationality which, for better or worse, determines the meaning of rationality, defines this concept in terms of logic, awareness, wants and needs (self-interest), beliefs, and implicitly also and primarily in terms of social rules (since rationality can only be judged by externally observable behavior, which can only be interpreted in terms of social rules like, say, mostly telling the truth, caring about other peopleīs reactions, and so on). This is unfortunate since a person might, say, by association be considered illogical when that person is just socially inept, or be otherwise misunderstood. In particular, a person might be deemed irrational, which has connotations to a lack of all the defining characteristics of rationality, by publicly disagreeing with some widely held belief.
Thus our perception of whatīs rational is, to a large degree, a constraint on our behavior. Nobody wants to be viewed as irrational! Yet the common concept of rationality is, in my view, either too much or too little, or both. To the degree that this constraint disallows free expression of opinions and beliefs, or makes irrational outcasts of people not conforming to mainstream societyīs rules of conduct, it is too much. On the other hand, when mass-murdering tyrants like Hitler or Stalin, or just the common simple murderers and rapists, can be considered as rational, the common concept of rationality is too narrow.
For these reasons I advocate a redefinition of rationality as outlined in the introduction.
Relative rationality.
Apart from the problems of deciding exactly what oneīs self-interest is, the conventional view of rationality as acting in oneīs best self-interest neglects an important aspect, namely that even when well-defined that self-interest is always relative to some context. Thus itīs meaningless to say that an action, by itself, is rational. Instead one might say (to the degree that rationality can be established!) that the action is rational with respect to a particular context.
The context for the rationality of an action includes
Timeframe (e.g. immediate consequences, far future consequences).
The setting (e.g. being nude on a Norwegian beach versus being nude at an American embassy reception).
The history leading up to the action, including what one believes other people believe.
All you have to do to convince someone of someone elseīs irrationality is to present irrefutable evidence, e.g. a photo, of an action taken out of context, and imply that this happened in another context. Of course thereīs another side to this coin: since rationality/irrationality can only be judged by externally observable behavior one is missing what the person thinks the context is, and one is interposing oneīs own opinion of that context. So another way to make a person seem irrational is to convince that person that the rationality context is something else than everybody else think it is (this can be fun or tragic).
Taking relativity one step further one might dispense with self-interest, and define a rationality concept based on who benefits from an action or set of actions. I call this relative rationality. For example, sacrificing oneīs life for the family might be irrational with respect to the individual (e.g. if that individual is forced to do so), but rational with respect to the family, or, as some scientists would have it (and Iīm not disagreeing), with respect to the propagation of the individualīs genes. Thus relative rationality is somewhat less subjective and more generally applicable than conventional common rationality. However, the definition of benefit is subjective: receiving a huge sum of money might be considered a boon or bane, depending on the receiver.
The role of religion.
By the criterion of having a world-consistent (or even just self-consistent) set of beliefs a religious person is definitely irrational. However, the concept of relative rationality provides a role for religious belief as a rationality enforcer, namely, for rationality with respect to society. Our basic instinct is to act purely egoistically. Small children have to be taught that unbridled egoism is not very nice, and through this early learning some very few of us develop a more or less altruistic self-interest. However, for most people the instinctive egoism is just barely held in check by the expectations of their immediate social environment. The egoism is still there, and will manifest itself in any situation where thereīs no social pressure, or obvious future consequences, to contain the urge.
The rationality timeframe for a religious person is, typically, eternity. Actions in the here and now will have consequences in the after-life. The setting for any action is an interaction with a god or gods, who keep meticulous records. The records will be inspected when the person is judged, e.g. for receiving immediate help, for admittance to a heaven or for reincarnation. And the history is, in some cases (depending on the religion), a set of earlier lives whose actions must be atoned for by doing good deeds. Thus the religious belief establishes a rationality context where the individual thinks itīs in his/her own best interest to act rationally with respect to society.
To uphold the rationality-enforcing beliefs most religions depend on three factors: social pressure (typically bolstered by a formal and relatively rigid dominance hierarchy and a set of rituals placing the religion as an important factor in the most momentous events of life), fear (of real things like death, and of artificial constructions like eternal hell), and early impregnation of ideas, which in less kind words might be called brainwashing of the young. This is abhorrent to many free-thinking people. However, to me the end justifies the means. Religion is the only well-proven tool for achieving rational behavior with respect to society. Thus, an infusion of proper religious ideas might be helpful in countries or regions struggling with poverty and/or social unrest.